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ABSTRACT
This paper presents an analytical frameworkthat can be used to analyze
the effects of unions on productivity inthe public sector. Our initial
focus is on public libraries becauseconsiderable effort has been devoted
to conceptualizing library productivitymeasures and because of the avail-
ability of data to implement the framework.
Preliminary estimates are
presented based upon data from 71 municipal librariesin Massachusetts.
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Research by economists on the economiceffects of unions in the
private sector has tended to focus on unions'effects on their members'
relative earnings positions.Following in the tradition of H.G. Lewfs'
pioneering work, a large number of studies haveaddressed this question.'
The more sophisticated ones usemicro—level data and seek to control both
for quality differentials and thepossibility that wages and Uniofl Status
may be simultaneously deteined.2 Mostrecently, other nonwage outcomes,
such as job satisfaction and laborturnover, have been considered and
analysts have attempted to ascertain ifpart of any observed union/nonunion
wage differential merely compensates unionizedemployees for relatively
unfavorable nonpecuniary conditions of employment.3
'H.G. Lewis, Unionismand Relative Wages in the United States(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963).
2See PeterSchmidt and Robert Strauss, "The Effect ofUnions on Earnings and Earnings on Unions: A Mixed Logit Approach,"
International Economic Review
(February 1976), Lung—Fe! Lee, "Unionism andWageRates: A Simultaneous
Equations Model With Qualitative and LimitedDependent Variables,"
national Economic Review (June 1978) andPeter Schmidt "Estimation of a
Simultaneous Equations Model WithJointly Dependent Continuous and Quali-
tative Variables: The Union—Earnings
Question Revisited," International Economic Review (June 1978).
3SeeGregg Duncan and Frank Stafford, "Do Union MembersReceive Compensating
Wage Differentials," American Economic Review
(June 1980); George Borjas, "Job Satisfaction, Wage andUnions," Journal of Human Resources (Winter1979); Richard Freeman, "Individual Mobility andCollective Voice in the Labor
Market," American Economic Review (May1976); and James Nedoff, "Layoffs and
Alternatives Under Trade Unions in UnitedStates Manufacturing," American Economic Review (June 1979).
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The traditional neoclassical view of unions asserts that although unions
may benefit their members, by creating noncompensating wagedifferentials
they cause allocative efficiency losses. Hence, their net impact onthe
economy as a whole is thought to benegative.4 Recently, however, this view
has been challenged by Richard Freeman, James Nedoff, and their associates
at Harvard.5 Drawing on hypotheses put forth long ago by institutional
economists, they argue that unions may well increase productivity.Such
increases may occur through a number of routes including union induced reduc-
tions in turnover, increases in morale and motivation, and increases in
formal and informal on—the—job training. Indeed, several of their econo-
metric studies suggest that union/nonunion productivity differentials in the
private sector are oftenpositive.6 To the extent that these results are
generalizable, one must become much more agnostic on the questionof whether
unions in the private sector have had net adverse efficiency effects.
Research on the effects of unions in the public sector has paralleled
the private sector studies. Numerous studies have sought to ascertainthe
4See, for example, Albert Rees, The Economics of Work and Pay,2nd ed.(New
York, Harper and Row, 1979), Chapter 10, for a summary of theneoclassical
view, which does not necessarily represent his personal view.
5A good nontechnical treatment of their views is found in Richard Freeman and
James Medoff, "The Two Faces of Unionism," Public Interest (Fall 1979).
6See, for example, Charles Brown and James Medoff, "Trade Unions in the Produc-
tion Process," Journal of Political Econy (June 1978), for evidence for
U.S. manufacturing; Kim Clark, "Unions and Productivity in the Cement
Industry" (unpublished Harvard University Ph.D. dissertation, 1978) and his
"The Impact of Unionization on Productivity: A Case Study," Industrial and
Labor Relations Review (July 1980), for evidence for the cement industry,
and Steven Allen, "Unionized Construction Workers Are More Productive?"
(mimeograph, 1979), for evidence for the U.S. construction industry. Lest
one conclude that unions always increase productivity, the evidenceavailable
for coal mining in the U.S. suggests this is not true. See Marie Connerton,
Richard Freeman, and James Medoff, "Productivity and Industrial Relations:
The Case of U.S. Bituminous Coal" (mimeo, 1979).3
effect of public sector unions on the relativewages of teachers, police,
firefighters and other categories of municipal employees.7 Recent studies
have moved beyond wage effects and analyzed the effects ofpublic sector
unions on nonwage employee benefits and on the trade—off betweenwages and
retirement system characteristics. 8
In contrast to the private sector research, however,no research has
been directed towards ascertaining the effects of unionson productivity in
the public sector. This fact is not completelysurprising; the concepts of
output and productivity in the public sector are often not well—defined and
the difficulties inherent in trying to measureproductivity are consequently
large. Nevertheless, the growing financial problems of state and local
governments suggest that this important problem cannot be ignored. Prior
studies of public sector wage determination have indicated,on average, that
unions have tended to have only modest effects on their members'compensation;
studies of public employee unions' effects onproductivity are required to
complete our understanding of the effects these unions have hadon municipal
finances and service flows.
7See, for example, OrleyAshenfelter, "The Effect of Unionization on Wages in
the Public Sector: The Case of Firefighters," Industrial andLabor Relations
Review (January 1971), Ronald Ehrenberg and GeraldGoldstein, "A Model of
Public Sector Wage Determination," Journal of UrbanEconomics, July 1975, and
Hirschell Kasper, "The Effects of CollectiveBargaining on Public School
Teachers Salaries," Industrial and Labor RelationsReview, October 1970).
8See, for example, DavidRogers, "Municipal Government Structure, Unions, and
Wage and Nonwage Compensation in the Public Sector" (unpublished Cornell
University M.S. thesis, 1979), Ronald G. Ehrenberg, "RetirementSystem Charac-
teristics and Compensating Differentials in the PublicSector," Industrial and Labor Relations Review,July1980, and Linda M. Edwards and Franklin
R. Edwards, "The Effect of Unionism on theMoney and Fringe Compensation of
Public Employees: The Case of Municipal Sanitation Workers"(mimeo, 1979).4
This paper represents our initial efforts at analyzing the effects of
unions on productivity in the public sector. We first sketch an analytical
framework that can be used to estimate these effects, focusing for expository
purposes on municipal public libraries. We initially focus onlibraries
because considerable effort has been devoted to conceptualizing productivity
measures for them and because of the availability of data to implement the
9
framework.After discussing the analytical framework, we present preliminary
estimates of the effects of unions on productivity in public libraries based
upon analyses of data from 71 municipal libraries inMassachusetts. We con-
clude by indicating how these analyses will be extended and the direction
that we hope our future research will take.
II. A Simply Analytic Framework
Municipal libraries produce a variety of outputs which include, but are
not limited to, the circulation of books, periodicals, and other audio-
visual materials, responding to information and inter—library loan requests,
and providing reference facilities. These outputs can in theory be evaluated
in both quantitative and qualitative ways. While one can simply count circu—
lation figures or the number of information requests, more sophisticated
valuations of library output would focus on questions like "What proportion
of information requests were answered correctly?" or "How long did the
typical borrower have to wait for a book that he or she wanted?"
For now we shall ignore the fact that libraries can be thought of as
multiple product firms and also ignore the quality dimension of the services they
provide. Instead, we assume that we can treat library output (Q)asbeing a
9For prior discussions of library productivity, see Malcolm Getz, Public
Libraries: An Economic View (Johns Hopkins Press, 1980), Karen Feldstein,
The Economics of Public Libraries (unpublished MIT Ph.D. dissertation, 1977),
F.W. Lancaster, The Measurement and Evaluation of Library Services
(Washington, D.C., 1977) and Ernst DeProspo, Ellen Altman, and Kenneth
Beasley, Performance Measures for Public Libraries (Chicago, 1973).5




HereP is the "price"the community must pay for a unit of library
services,other things equal thehigher the price the less library services
willbe demanded.The position of the demandcurve will depend uponcom-
munityincome or wealth, with higher income areasdemanding more library ser-
vices and it will also obviously dependupon the size of the community
(V1).
Finally, the demand curve will depend upon the community's "taste" for
library services (V2). For example, more highly educated communitiesmay
demand more library services, as may communities with a largeproportion of
school—age children.
The second element of our model is a production function forlibrary
services
(2) Q =F(K,L!V3,U)
Here we have treated output, capital (K) and labor(L) as single variables.
The capital stock includes the library's entire stockof materials as of
the current period.V3 is a vector which represents those community van—
ables that affect the position or shape of theproduction function. For
example, one early study found that two—thirds tothree—quarters of all
library users lived within one mile of a library.10 Thissuggests that
'°BernardBerelson, The Library is Public (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1949).6
increasesin population density, which make iteasierto locate branch
librarieswithin a mile of all individuals, would increase the output of
library services, ceteris paribus.
The production function of library services may alsobe a function of
whetherthe library's employees are represented by a union. As noted by
Freemanand Medoff, unionization may well increase productivity through
routes including union induced reductions in turnover, increases in morale
and motivation, and increases in formal and informal on—the—job training.11
On the other hand, unionization of library employees may well reduce produc-
tivity if it places limits on library management's ability to substitute
factors of production or if it requires library management to devote more
resources to the contract negotiation process and to the resolution of
grievances.12 Of key concern to us is what the net effect of unions on the
production function is.
The stock of capital that a library has depends upon its stock of capital
in the preceeding period (K1), its investment in new capital (I), and the
rate at which its previous stock of capital depreciates (6). The latter
depends upon the age distribution of the library's books (in the main books
are used most heavily in the initial years following their purchase) and the
resources that the library devotes to maintaining its collection and avoiding
theft. We shall ignore the latter two considerations here and treat the
depreciation rate as a constant.
11Freeman and Medoff, "The Two Faces of Unionism," PublicInterest, Fall 1979.
'2See, for example, Marilyn Oberg, Mary Blackburn, and Joan Dible, "Unioni-
zation Costs and Benefits to the Individual and to the Library," in Margaret
Chaplan, ed., Employee Organizations and Collective Bargaining in Libraries,
Library Trends, 25, October 1976, and Milton Byran, "Implications for Public
Libraries" in Frederick Schlipf, ed., Collective Bargaining in Libraries
(Urbana, Illinois, 1975).7
(3) K =I+(l—ó)K
The costs incurred bya library are primarily forlabor, for new
acquisjjo, and for maintaining the
library's collection andbuildings.
Let W be the cost per unit of
labor, m the per unit cost ofmaintaining the
collection and C the user cost ofnew materials. Then the totalcosts the
library incurs is given by
(4)C=wL+CI+
For later reference, remember
that a primary goal of unionsis to increase
their members' wages. To theextent that they aresuccessful, W will be
an increasing function of U.
The cost function forlibrary services is obtained by
minimizing (4),
subject to (2) and (3). Fromthis, one can obtain theaverage cost function
for library services.
(5) AC =AC(QIW,C,m,v,oKFU)
If the underlying libraryproduction function exhibitsconstant (decreasing)
(increasing) returns to scale,average cost will be constant (increasewith
output) (decrease with output).
We have plotted the demand
curve and average cost curve forlibrary
services in Figure 1; the latterunder the assumption ofconstant average
costs. The average cost curverepresents the price to thelibrary of pro-
ducing different levels of libraryservices. Given the demandcurve, D,
Q* units of library serviceswill be demanded andproduced. At this level














The equilibrium level of library servicescan be expressed as the
reduced form equation
(6) Q*G(V1,V2,V3,W,C,m,tS,KFU)
Obviously, anything that shifts the demand curveup will increase output
while anything that shifts theaverage cost curve up will reduce it. The
key point to note is that observed output is determinedby both demand and
cost factors.
The effects of unions on service flowsoperate both via their effects
on wages and their effects on the production function (2). Ifunions do
increase the wages of library employees this wouldshift the average cost
curve up and reduce output. If unions increase (decrease) thelevel of out-
put associated with any given input levels (for thereasons discussed
earlier) this will shift the average cost curve down(up), thereby increasing
(decreasing) output.
Equation (6) provides a simple framework which can be usedto estimate
the effects of unions on productivity. Ifcross—section data on library
services, the demand and cost variables, and unionizationcan be obtained,
the model can be implemented. The coefficient ofthe unionization variable
in this model would represent the net effect oflibrary unions on produc-
tivity. If one were to estimate (6) omitting thewage variable, however,
the coefficient of the unionization variable wouldcapture both the net
effect of unions on the production function forlibrary services and the
effect of union induced wage gains onaverage costs and hence output.10
III. Extensions of the Framework
The simple framework sketched above may be inadequate for a number of
reasons. First, the wage of library employees is endogenous, in the
sense that it will be determined both by whether the library employees
are unionized and the forces that affect the demand for library services, as
well as other variables (V4).13 As such, if one were to specify a wage
determination equation of the form
(7) W =W(V,V2,v4,U)
it is likely that tne error term in this equation would be correlated with
the error term in (6). This might happen, for example, if data on some
variable that affected the demand for library services was unavailable and
omitted from both equations (6) and (7). If correlated error terms occurred, biased
estimates of (6) would result if it was estimated by ordinary least squares.
Second, the extent of unionization, as measured by whether a library's
employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement is also likely to
be endogenously determined. It is not unreasonable to expect that collective bar-
gaining coverage will be a function both of state laws governing public employee
unionization, and the proportions of public and private employees in a state
that are union members. The size of the library is also likely to matter;
large libraries may be more bureaucratic in nature and more conducive to
14
unionization. Finally, collective bargaining coverage is likely to be
13For a discussion of the variables that influencepublic sector wage
determination, see Ehrenberg and Goldstein, .2P•cit.
14Theodore Guyton, Unionization: TheViewpoint of Librarians (Chicago, 1975).11
related to both the estimatedwage premium associated with collective bar-
gaining and the estimated productivity differentialassociated with collective
bargaining; the former because it influences bothemployees demand for collec-
tive bargaining coverage and librarymanagement's resistance to it, the
latter because the productivity effectsassociated with collective bargain-
ing also influence management's resistance to it.
This suggests the need for a full—blown"selectivity bias" corrected
model.15Separate wage and library outputequations can be estimated for
libraries covered by and not coveredby union contracts, in the context of
a model in which the probability that
a library is unionized is determinedby the
estimated union/nonunion wage andoutput differentials that exist for it,as
well as other explanatory variables. Theappendix traces out formally how
this can be done.
Third, the analyses describedabove focuses on the effectof unions on
observed output; the latter isa determined by both demand andcost considera-
tions. One might prefer insteadto focus directly on theunderlyLng produc-
tion process for libraryservices and ask questions like"Does the existence
of unions alter library
output per employee?", "Do unionsaffect the substi-
tutability of capital for labor inthe provision of libraryservices?".
Or shifting to thecase of multiple types oflibrary employees (e.g.,
librarians, other professional
employees, library aides, otherclerical
employees), "Do unions alter the
Substitutability of differentcategories of
library employees in the face ofrelative price changes?".Such generaliza-
tions would involveusing a variant of the "production
function" approach
15SeeLung—Fei Lee, .cit.,for the genesis of thisapproach.12
used by Brown and Medoff, and Clark, and/or estimating the parameters of a
production function from cost share data.
For example, if the production function for library service in equation
(2) can be written as
(8) Q= a(L(l+BU))la
where B represents the proportionate marginal productivity differential of
union labor, and U equals one if the library is unionized and zero otherwise,
then
(9) log()logA ÷cdog(K/L)+(l—ci)BU
Hence, regressing the log of output per library employee on those demographic
variables that affect library productivity (variables that underlie A, the
log of the capital/labor ratio, and whether the library is organized would
enable one to estimate the proportionate marginal productivity advantage of
16
union labor. The extension to allow for nonconstant returns to scale or
more than one category of labor is straightforward in this model. To test
for union effects on substitutability, however, obviously requires more
flexible functional forms such as the CES or translog ones.
16See Brown-Medoff,.cit.13
IV.PreliminaryEmpirical Results: The Determinants
2Productivity in Massachusetts Public Librariesin 1977
In 1977 the International
City Management Association conducteda survey
of municipal public libraries,obtaining data on library revenues and
expenditures, employment and wage scales fordifferent categories of library
employees, the number of books in eachlibrary, and various measures of
library usage including circulation,borrowers, and interlibrary loans.
The latter three variables
were published, by library, in the 1978Municp
Yearbook, and when coupled with publisheddata on socioecononijc characteristics
of cities obtained from the 1977
City and County Databook and publisheddata
on whether any library employeeswere covered by a collectivebargaining
agreement in each Hassachusetts municipality in
1977, permit us to estimate
equations of the form
10
(10)K1 BK.r.. + KUi + EK. K=1,2,3,4,5
for a sample of 71 municipallibraries.
Equation (10) is a condensed version ofthe reduced form libraryoutput
equation (6) derived in Section II. The
output measures available are inter—
library loans per capita(Q1), number of borrowers per capita(Q2), circula-
tion per capita (Q3), interlibraryloans per borrower(Q4), and circulation
per borrower (Q5); each measure expressed innatural logarithm form. The
former three measuresmay be thought of as measures of totalservices pro-
vided, while the latter twomay be regarded as measures of thequantity of
services provided per libraryuser.
The r are those variables thatare expected to influence libraryout-
put, either from the demand or cost sidesof the model. The cost sideis14
captured here by population density (r1); as noted earlier previous studies
have suggested that increased population density reduces the cost of pro-
viding library services, and hence should increase library output. The
demand side is represented by a set of variables expected to influence a
community's preferences for library services; these include the percent of
the population that is female (r7), the percent nonwhite (r3), the percents
of the population that are older than age 18 (r4) and age 65 (r5), the median
education level in the community (r6), the female labor force participation
rate (r9), and the fraction of employees in the municipality employed in
education (r10). The demand side also is represented by the community's
capacity to pay for library services, as measured by median family income
(r7), and per capita intergovernmental revenues (r8). Finally, U. is a
dichotomous variable indicating whether any library employees in the munici-
pality were covered by a collective bargaining agreement in 1977.
Several things should be noted about this specification. Data limita-
tions in this initial study preclude a number of variables that appear in
equation (6) from appearing in equation (10). The omitted variables include
the wage rates of library employees, the lagged stock of library materials,
and the rate at which library materials depreciate. The estimated coef-
ficients which we report below should be considered very tentative then;
they may well suffer from omitted variable bias. In particular, because
library employees' wages were unavailable in this sample, the coefficient of
the unionization variable will capture both the net effects of collective
bargaining on the production function for library services and of union
induced wage gains on average costs and hence output.15
OurpreLiminary estimates ol ejuation (10) appear in Table 1. The
populations of the mUILfpalltit:s in our sample varied from 10,000 to over
500,000 and to cont rH forheterscedasticity we haveweighted each obser-
vation bythesquare root of its population, The employees were covered by a
collective bargaining agreement inapproximatelyone—quarter of thelibraries
inthe sample.
Turning first to the vector of variables other than unionization,many
of these variables af LOLt Library output in a manner consistent withour
a priori predictions. An increase in the school age population (decrease in
r,) increases library usage as does an increase in the proportion of the
population over age 65 (r.). An increase in the median education level of
the population (r6) also leads La higher usage, as does an increase in the
proportion of employees who are employed in the education industry
(r10).
in contrast, neither of the variables that reflect the communities'
capacity to pay (r7 and r8) are significantly related to library output.
While an increase in the proportion of the population that is female
(r2)
leads to an increase in the number of borrowers, a result thatmight be
expected if females tend not to be in the labor force, an increase in the
labor force participation rate of females(r9) is associated with higher
circulation of library materials. Finally, an increase in populationdensity
(r1) leads to a reduction in library output and an increase in the proportion
of the population that is nonwhite(r3) to higher output.'7
17Malcolm Getz, Public Libraries:An Economic View, finds a similar negative
relationship between density and library output in his study of branch
libraries in New York City. He argues that populationdensity may be a
proxy for the rental cost of structures, with more dense areas having
higher rental rates. If this occurs, the average cost of library services
may well be higher in denser areas which would lead, from Figure 1, to a
lower level of library services. Thus, a negativerelationship between
population density and library output may well be consistent withour model.16
Theprimary vnri:hie of interest to us, of course, isthe unionization
variable. These data suggest that libraries covered by a collective bargain-
ing agreement have, ceteris parii:us, some 29.2(exp(.256)—i) percent more
borrowers per capita than do nonunion libraries. Both circulationand inter—
library loansper capita appear to be lower inunionized Libraries, however
theseeffects are notsignificnntlydifferent from zero. Because of these
results, it is not Surprisingt:haton a per borrower basis, circulation and
interlibrory loans are alsolowerinunionizedlibraries 18
How robust are these results to the estimation methods used? Row (1)
of Table 2 summarizes compactly the estimated collective bargainingeffects
from Table 1. Rows (2) and (3) show that estimates obtained whenthe method
of ordinary least squares is used (row (2)) and when an additional variable,
median age, is included to more fully control for the agedistribution of
the population (row (3)) are virtually identical.
As noted in Section ILl, however, all of these estimates maywell be
subject to selectivity bias. Using the method describedin the appendix,
19
one can attempt to control for this problem. First a reduced form probit
equation is estimated that determines the probabilitythat a library's
employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement.From these equa-
tions, one can compute estimates of variables which arethen added to the
productivity equations to control for the probabilitythat a library's
employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement.These "augmented"
18Put another way, if an increase in a variable causes the log of X1 to
increase but does not affect the log of X2, it is not surprising that
the log of (X2/X1) falls.
19Actually, the method implemented here is simpler since it ignores library
employees' wage rates.17
productivity equations can then be estimated by ordinary leastsquares
and consistent parameter estimates obtained; this is doneseparately for
libraries that are covered by a collective bargainingagreement and those
that are not. Finally, the estimated parameters and themean values of
the explanatory variables can be used to compute consistent estimates of
the union/nonunion productivity differentials.
Estimates of the reduced form probit equationappear in Table 3. The
variables that appear in the equation include those in theoutput equations
as well as population size, population growth, and the share of employment
in the city in a number of industries. These latter variableswere included
because they tend to be related to the extent of private sector unionization
across SMSA's.° ii1e the vector of coefficients is clearly jointly signi-
ficantly at the .05 level, most of the individual coefficients are statis-
tically insignificant. The few significant coefficients suggest that collec-
tive bargaining for library employees in Massachusetts tends tooccur in
cities with older populations (r5), higher female labor forceparticipation
rates (r9), and lower levels of service industry employment
(r15).
These estimates are then used, as described above, to obtain consistent
estimates of the productivity equations and estimates of the Union/nonunion
productivity differentials.21 These differentials are summarized in row (4)
of Table 2; in the main their pattern is very similar to theprevious results.
20See forexample, Barry T. Hirsch, "The Determinants of Unionization: An
Analysis of Interarea Differences," Industrial and Labor RelationsReview,
January 1980.
21For brevity,we do not report the regression coefficients for the
"selectivity corrected" output equations here.18
V. Extensions and Euture Directions
This paper has laid out a methodological framework for estimating the
effects of unions on productivity in the public sector and presented some
preliminary estimates for a sample of 71 municipal public libraries in
Massachusetts. The empirical estimates themselves should not be stressed,
however, as the underlying data suffer from a number of weaknesses. First,
thereare numerous important variables omitted from the data set, including
wages and employment levels oflibraryemployees, new acquisitions, and the
stockof library materials; these omissions may seriously bias the estimated
union effects. Second, we have not made a serious attempt to specify the
determinants of whether a library is covered by a collective bargaining
agreement, only a limited number of variables were entered into that equation
and this could further bias our results. Finally, the libraries in our
sample all are located in one state and span a wide range of city sizes
(under 10,000 to over 500,000). Since libraries in different size cities
perform different functions and time likelihood of collective bargaining
coverage is positively related to city size, this will further distort our
findings.
We hope to get around all of these problems in future work. The ICMA
has made the data tape, upon which their published report on municipal
libraries was based, available to us. This tape provides fairly compre-
hensive data on all of the "library variables" needed to implement the
various approaches discussed in Sections II and III for approximately 250
cities of population size 25,000 or greater. Socioeconomic characteristic
variables for these cities can be obtained from the 1977 City and County
Databook. Finally, we have obtained data on the collective bargaining19
coverage of library employees in these cities by a mail survey; ourresponse
rate to this survey has been well over 90 percent.
Because these cities do not all lie in one state, it will be
possible for us to better model the forces that affect theprobability that
library employees in a city are covered by a collective bargainingagreement.
These include the extent of public and private unionization ina state,
variables for which published data exists, as well as the lawsgoverning
public sector collective bargaining in a state. Our colleague John Burton
has expended considerable effort to collect dataon, and to parameterize,
these laws and has generously made these data available tous. A
substantially better specified probability of collective bargainingcoverage
equation should reduce the likelihood that our estimates ofunion productivity
effects are subject to selectivity bias.
In addition to our more comprehensive analysis ofthe effect of unions
on productivity in public libraries, we also plan topursue the question of
the routes via which unions influenceproductivity in the public sector.
Our initial focus in this aspect of the project will beon public education
and we will make use of a unique set of longitudinal dataon educational
outcomes, school, district background variables, and union contract pro—
visions that our colleague Sam Bacharach has constructed for local school
districts in New York State. Our analyses here will permitus to test for
the effects of specific union contract pvisions on educationaloutcomes,
rather than for the effects of collective bargainingcoverage per se. The
longitudinal nature of the data will permit the application of econometric
methods that allow one to control for omitted variables that otherwisemight20
bias the analyses.22 That is, these methods substantially reduce the like-
lihood that the estimates that result will be subject to selectivity bias
becauseomitted variables that affect the probability of collective bargain-
ingcoverage or contract provisions may also affect educational outcomes.
22For details, see Ronald G. Ehrenberg, "Unions andProductivity in the
Public Sector" (proposal submitted to the National Science Foundation,
March 1980).21
Table 1
Determinants of Productivity in Massachusetts Public
Libraries in 1977: Weighted Least Squares
(absolute value t statistics)
Ind./Dep.
Q Q Q Q Var./Var. 2 3 4 5
r1a -.111 (3.0) -.056 (4.3) -.066 (7.1)-.059 (1.6)-.009 (0.8)
—.060 (0.6) .090 (2.6) —.004 (0.2) —.151 (1.6)—.094 (2.8)
r3 .138 (2.1) .041 (1.8) .021 (1.3) .097 (1.6)—.020 (0.9)
-.138 (1.9)-.021 (0.8) -.067 (3.8) -.117 (1.7)-.045 (1.9)
r5 .192 (1.6) -.006 (0.1) .127 (4.3) .197 (1.7) .132 (3.2)
r6 .487 (2.0) .173 (2.0) .186 (3.1) .313 (1.3) .013 (0.2)
r7a —.038 (0.5) -.014 (0.5) .015 (0.8) —.023 (0.3) .028 (1.2)
r8a —.045 (0.0) .094 (0.2) .014 (0.0) —.149 (0.1) .080 (0.2)
4.873 (1.2) -.879 (0.6) 2.096 (2.1)5.752 (1.5)2.975 (2.2)
3.566 (0.8) 2.139 (1.4)4.668 (4.2)1.427 (0.3)2.529 (1.7)
U —.540 (1.5) .256 (2.1) —.128 (1.5) —.797 (2.3)—.385 (3.2)
.334 .515 .731 .235 .417
n =71for all equations
a =coefficienthas been multiplied by 1000
and
Q1= log(interlibrary loans per capita)
=log(number of borrowers per capita)
Q3= log(circulation per capita) in 1977





r4 =percentof the population age 18 and over
r5percent of the population age 65 and over in 1970
r6 =medianeducation level
r7 =medianfamily income
r8per capita intergovernmental revenue
=femalelabor force participation rate
r10 fraction of employees in education22
Table 1 (continued)
U =lanylibrary employees have a collective bargaining agreement,O=otherwise
Source:
(1)Q1to —1978Municipal Yearbook
(2)r, to r —1977City and County Databook and 1970 Censusof Population
10
(3) U —CollectiveBargaining in Massachusetts Libraries:Guidance for



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Probit Estimates of Whether Any Library Employees Are
Covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement in 1977





































where r11 fraction of employees in manufacturing
r12 fractionof employees in transportation and
public utilities
r13 fractionof employees in the service industry
r14 fractionof employees in construction
r15 1975 population
r16 percentage populationchange 1960—1975
Cintercept term
and
aCoefficient has been multiplied by 1000.
24ppend ix
Our goal is to estimate whether libraries whose employees are union
members are more, or less, productive than otherwise identical libraries
whose employees are not union members and to estimate the extent that unions
increase library employees' wages. Suppose that the output of library i
would be Q. if its employees were covered by a collective bargainingagree-
ment and Q. if its employees were not covered by a collective bargaining
agreement. Suppose also that the wages that the library's employees would
receive in the two environments would be Wand W .respectively.Then we Ui fli
can define the relative output differential, dqj and the relative wage
differential, d., associated with collective bargaining for the 1th library,
as
(Al) dqi =uini)ni
d.= (W.—W .)/W .log(W.1W .) Wi Ui niiii ui n3.
In general, it is not possible to observe both Q. and Q .,orW . and Ui fli Ui
W with cross—section data, as at a point in time either a library's
employees are covered by an agreement or they are not. A naive approach
that circumvents this problem is to estimate wage and output equations
separately for employees in cities with and without agreements, use the
estimated coefficients from these regressions and the characteristics of a
city to compute predicted values of the wage and library output that would
be observed in both sectors, and then estimate the differentials by calcu-
lating the percentage difference in these predicted values.A2
More formally, suppose that we postulate that the wage rate library
employees would receive in a city if they are unionized is a log linear
function of a vector of variables, X, which represent all of the variables
that would appear in equation (7) in the text, plus a random error term
K
(A2) logW .= . a.X. + c uijl juju li
and that a similar functional relationship exists that describes the wage
that library employees would receive in a city if they were not unionized.
K
(A3) 10gW .. a. X..+c ni j--l jn ji2i
Suppose also that similar output equations could be derived; these
correspond to the reduced form output equation (6) in the text, where the
represent all of the variables in equation (6) save the extent of
unionization, and c3. and are random error terms
M
(A4) logQ .= . B.Y. .+c uijljuji 11.
M
(A5) logQ .= . B.Y.. +c fli j1 jfl 314i
Thenaive approach would involve estimating the parameters of (A2) and (A4)
by ordinary least squares from observations on libraries whose employees
were unionized and the parameters of (A3) and (A5) by ordinary least squaresA3
from observations on libraries whoseemployees were not organized. Given
estimates of these parameters (si., a. , . , . ) andthe relevant charac— jujnjujn
teristics of a representative city (X.., Y..),one can then obtain estimates
of the relative output and wage differentials from
-' M
(A6) d .log(Q./Q.). (B.—B. )Y.. qi ul nij=l ju jn ji
K
d .= log(W./W.) = . (a.—ci. )X.. Wi ul nij=l ju jn ji
As is now well known, however, estimates ofwage and output equations
from truncated samples will notnecessarily yield unbiased estimates of the
parameters of the underlying wage and output equations (and henced. and duj)
since the assumption that the error term in eachequation is random and
uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables istypically violated.
This occurs because libraries are notrandomly assigned to collective bargain-.
ing status, but rather employees and librarymanagement make explicit choices
on the matter. Estimates of the wage and outputequations that ignore the
underlying choice model will be biased because they willconfound the effect
of an explanatory variable on wages andoutput with its effect on the proba—
bility that the library's employees are covered bya collective bargaining
agreement. To correct for this sample selectivity problemrequires us to model
the underlying economic choiceprocess that determines whether a library's
employees are unionized. This problem is complicatedby the fact that such
an event is a product of both employee and employer decisions.
To keep our estimation problemmanageable, we assume that the choice
process that determines whether a library's employeesare covered by a collec-
tive bargaining agreement can be approximatedbyA4
* R
(A7)S.=ód.+ód.+ 6Z.+v.





Here S. is an unobserved variable that represents the likelihood that
a municipal library will be unionized, v. is a random error term, and the
Z are all of the variables expected to influence the probability of observ-
ing a collective bargaining agreement, other than dqj and d.. The parameter
is assumed to be greater than zero, as positive output effects resulting
from collective bargaining should reduce employers' opposition to collective
bargaining. The sign of is indeterminate, however, as positive union!
nonunion wage differentials will increase library employees' demand for
collective bargaining, but also increase municipal employers' attempts to
resist unionization.
Although S. is not observed, we can arbitrarily scale its cut—off value
to be zero, so that if S. is greater than zero, the library's employees will
be covered by a collective bargaining agreement (U. =1).Similarly, if the
index is less than or equal to zero, the employees would not be covered by
an agreement (U. 0).
Consistent estimates of the model specified in (Al) through (A7) can
be obtained using an iterative procedure originally suggested by Lung—fei
Lee.One can substitute the wage and output equations (A2) to (A5) into
(Al) and (A7) to obtain a reduced form probit selection model
* T *




where the X. are all of the predeterminedvariables in the model (X, Y, and
Z's) and n1 is a random error term. Nowsuppose that the error terms from
this reduced form selection model and thewage and library output equations
are jointly normally distributed with meanszero and the following covariance
mat r ix
(All) 0
a11 012 013 l4 °ln
N 021 022 023 024 02n
0
U3l 032 033 03403
0
041 042 043044 04
0
°nl °n2 °n3 °n4 0nn
Under these assumptions one can show that
K
(A12) E(logW jx..,u. =1)=. , X..+ (/0)A.+ h ui p. 1jlju p. in n iu ii
K
(Al3) E(logW .X..,U. =0)=. a•X.. + (a /0)A.+ h ni p. i j=ljn p. 2n n in 2i
and
N
(Al4) E(logQ H..,U.=1)=.EB. Y.. + (a Ia)A.+ h ui p. iJlju p. 3n n iu 3i
H
(A15) E(logQ HY..,u. =0).B. Y• + (a Ia)A.+ h rI]_ p. 1 j=ljn p. 4n n in 4i
Here the h. are normally distributed randomvariables with mean zero and the
are given byA6
T * T *
(A16) A. =(AiBX./o)/[l
T * n *
A.=— q(—B X ./c )/(—B X ./c ) in t=l tti n t=1 tti n
where q() denotesthe normal probability density function and 'thecorres-
ponding distribution function.
Equations (A12) through (A16) make it clear why OLS estimates of the
underlying wage and output equations (A2) through (A5) may lead to biased
estimates. As long as the error terms in the wage or output equations are
correlated with the error term in the reduced form selection rule (c O, in
G 0° O)OLS estimates will be biased due to an omitted variable.
2n 3n 4n
While A. and A.are not directly observed, estimates of them may be obtained
iu in
by first estimating the reduced form probit selection model (AlO) obtaining
estimated coefficients (Be/cr), and then using these estimates to compute
predicted values A. and A. for each individual. Lee (1978) shows that
iu in
estimation of (A2) to (A5) by OLS, with A.(A. )addedas an additional
iuin
explanatory variable, over a sample of libraries that are covered by (not
covered by) a collective bargaining agreement, will lead to consistent
estimates of thea. and B.(a. and B. ).Consequently,consistent estimates
ju jujn jfl
of the estimated wage and output differentials associated with collective
bargaining coverage may be obtained from (A6).